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ABSTRACT: Do the aesthetic aspects of our experience play 
a role in our happiness or must we avoid any aesthetic 
conditioning of our freedom in order to lead a good life? 
This paper is based on some philosophical ideas derived 
from John Dewey's thought, which are examined in the 
light of the debate on happiness, well-being and human 
flourishing that has productively been conducted on the 
threshold between philosophy and economics.   
 
 
 
Setting out from Dewey's thesis that aesthetic aspects 
are structural traits of every experience which concern 
our dependence on the surrounding environment, the 
paper suggests that the Enlightenment ideals of freedom 
and autonomy are not enough to develop a morally and 
politically good life, because a good life must also be a 
full, satisfactory one, that is an inclusive, expanding life, 
emotionally and imaginatively rich, capable of final 
consummations and not only of analytical reflections.  
 
In particular, the author argues that Dewey's suggestions 
allow us to consider a further option in addition to those 
presently discussed: one strictly related to the 
structurally aesthetic or qualitative traits of our human 
interactions with the environment and capable of not 
being confined to an idea of happiness as something 
totally consisting in momentary sensory pleasure, but 
also of not neglecting or expunging our sensibility. 
 
Can aesthetics claim to have any serious connection with 
our idea of happiness and with our actual well-being? Or 
is it better for this philosophical discipline to merely 
theorize about Art, still written with a capital “A” and 
rigorously expressed in the singular? 
 
We might like to refer here to the first letters Über die 
ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, in which Friedrich 
Schiller tries to convince his interlocutor and patron, 
Prince Friedrich Christian von Schleswig-Holstein-
Augustenburg, that in order to face the dramatic political 
situation and the moral crisis of the period immediately 
following the French Revolution, he ought to consider 
the possibility of a new development of humanity 
through the medium of an aesthetic education. This long 
path should start from a new anthropological stance that 
will neglect neither the human impulse to lend form to 
every field of experience – the cognitive dimension, but 
above all the moral one – nor more sensuous, material 
drives, encouraging us to find satisfaction in our lives. In 
Schiller's opinion, aesthetic freedom is not foreign to the 
opposite necessities these impulses force us to follow; 
on the contrary, it results from the capacity to play 
opposite necessities off against one another, thereby 
annulling their coercive qualities.1 
 
I am not sympathetic to Schiller's transcendental 
solution to our moral and political problems, but I 
believe that he was able to see into some basic human 
needs, which must be seriously considered if we wish to 
think about happiness, well-being and freedom – that is, 
about what kind of life we wish to live – starting from 
our being peculiarly complex social organisms and not 
disembodied consciousness, or in other words from the 
material culture we live in. 
 
My approach will be based on some philosophical ideas 
derived from John Dewey's thought, which in my opinion 
can be used and further developed in the debate on 
happiness, well-being and human flourishing which has 
productively been conducted on the threshold between 
philosophy and economics. 
 
1. A look at the aesthetic aspects of our experience 
 
The point of departure of my argument is the fact that 
the conception of the aesthetic in the thought of John 
Dewey is not – or not primarily – confined to either the 
allegedly strict realm of the so-called fine arts, or to the 
                                                 
1 Schiller, J.C.F. 1879. Über die ästhetische Erziehung des 
Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen. Stuttgart: J.G. 
Cotta, in particular the two opening letters. 
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wider field of human artistic behaviours. Even before 
being developed and refined into more or less proper 
artistic activities, the aesthetic aspects of every 
experience constitute structural traits: they concern our 
being dependent upon and exposed to our surrounding 
natural and naturally social environment and our 
interacting with it from the inside. To use a different, 
philosophically more traditional language, we might say 
that the aesthetic concerns the deepest roots of our 
humanity, that it plays a central role in shaping our 
humanity. The aesthetic concerns sensibility understood 
primarily not as sense perception, but rather as 
affectivity, as emotional exposure to the natural and 
social environment surrounding and affecting us – from 
the most bodily aspects to the more intellectual ones.  
 
To be more analytic2, we might say that in Experience 
and Nature the adjective “aesthetic” – Dewey never 
resorts to the noun form – appears to characterize the 
basic traits of our immediate experience, that is those 
qualitative aspects unreflexively connoting human 
interactions with the environment, both in its natural 
and in its social constituents. I will at once feel the 
situation I find myself in to be comfortable or dangerous 
for my own existence, attractive or disgusting, 
pleasurable or unpleasant. According to Dewey, these 
experiential traits are meaningful for the impact they 
have on our lives, because of what things and other 
individuals can do to us directly. By contrast, when a 
certain problem arises about what to do, we have to 
stop, the fulfilment of a certain experience has to be 
postponed, the complex whole of an immediate 
experience has to be reflexively reconsidered and 
thought of as a means to something else – in terms not 
of what things and persons can do to us directly, but 
                                                 
2 I have analysed this subject in the second chapter of my 
book on sensibility and language: see Dreon, R. 2003. Il 
sentire e la parola. Linguaggio e sensibilità tra filosofie ed 
estetiche del novecento. Milano-Udine: Mimesis, pp.49-
73. 
with reference to further things.3 This is why Dewey can 
claim that immediate experience is consummatory, that 
is that it comes at once to the end of the interaction, 
that it comes to its fulfilment, even if the concept of 
consummatory experience can be used to identify a 
certain phase of an experience – but I shall return to this 
aspect towards the end of my discussion.  
 
Dewey does not feel the need to clarify why he uses the 
word “aesthetic” – maybe because this use was rather 
common in pragmatism – but he explicitly bases it on the 
distinction between having or feeling a certain situation 
and knowing it, that is analytically reconsidering it in the 
light of further ends. This is a kind of sensibility which 
cannot be ascribed to what is allegedly only a form of 
sensory perception, because the senses themselves, 
together with our organic constitution, play a central 
role, yet in affective terms, as something qualitative or 
emotional and not as a source of alleged primary pure 
perceptual data.  
 
Hence, aesthetic aspects are basic traits of our 
environmental experience, which would appear to be an 
essential part of us as human beings – but of course, 
they can further be developed into eminently artistic 
experiences. 
 
This is not a complete novelty: some substantial 
differences notwithstanding, one might consider the 
significance of the Gefühl der Lust und der Unlust in 
Kant's Critique of Judgement – although this is not the 
place to pursue such comparison any further. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Dewey, J. 1988. Experience and Nature. In: The Later 
Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, Vol.1: 1925, 
Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University 
Press. 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  6,  I ssu e 1 ,  2015 
TH E  AE S T H E T I C ,  P L E A S U R E  A N D  H A P P I N E S S ,  O R :  W H Y  F R E E D O M  I S  N O T  E N O U G H  
R o b e r t a  D r e o n  
 
 
 10 
It has been already noted4 that William James too 
assigned a primary role to the aesthetic dimension of 
experience. 
 
In particular, we might say that James and Dewey share 
the thesis that the aesthetic, qualitative or affective 
aspects of our experiences do not match the traditional 
dichotomy between subjective and objective. Dewey's 
strong anti-dualism leads him to claim that if I feel a 
certain environment to be hostile – and later in Art as 
Experience he was to speak of a sad picture5 – I am not 
projecting my subjective hostility on a certain context, or 
my supposedly private mental state on a certain artistic 
object; rather “hostile” and “sad” are first of all traits of 
the peculiar interactions that are taking place, and 
therefore they regard both the subjective and the 
objective side as non-independent parts of their 
relations.6 
                                                 
4 Cf. Shusterman, R. “Dewey's Art as Experience: The 
Psychological Background”. In: Journal of Aesthetic 
Education, 44/1, 2010, pp.26-43 and Shusterman, R. 
“The Pragmatist Aesthetics of William James”. In: British 
Journal of Aesthetics, 51/4, 2011, pp.347-361. 
5 Dewey, J. 1989. Art as Experience. In: The Later Works 
of John Dewey, 1925-1953, Vol.10: 1934, Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press. 
6 James upholds the thesis (in James, W. 1983. The Place 
of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience. In: 
Essays in Psychology, Cambridge-London: Harvard 
University Press, pp.168-187) that the ambiguous or 
hybrid character of affective phenomena proves that the 
distinction between material and spiritual aspects does 
not regard two different substances, but only two 
diverse kinds of functions or relations, because we tend 
to differentiate things depending on their ways of acting. 
While according to the individualistic tradition “our 
pleasures and pains, our loves and fears and angers” but 
also “the beauty, comicality, importance or preciousness 
of certain objects and situations” must be ascribed to the 
spiritual dimension, we must often take into account the 
“immediate bodily effects” that affectional facts produce 
on us. Hence, according to James, this instability shows 
that our distinction between material and spiritual, 
subjective and objective, is not already given in the 
world, since in our lives we do not need to classify what 
is happening. It is rather when “more purely intellectual” 
needs emerge that we begin to distinguish various 
aspects, being driven to do so by specific situations. Yet, 
as Dewey might put it, this kind of distinction is an 
analytical, reflexive one rather than a primary one, and it 
Dewey and James also agree on the thesis that the 
aesthetic or qualitative aspects of our experience 
provide crucial orientation even on a cognitive level. 
Dewey's position – from Qualitative Thought and 
Affective Thought7 to Art as Experience – is clear enough 
in pointing out that these aspects function as selection 
and guidance criteria to distinguish the relevant factors 
in our experiences, while also functioning as control 
criteria to test the capacity of a certain reflexive analysis 
to resolve the problems arising from an indeterminate 
situation and to enrich our immediate experiences. We 
might also suggest that the aesthetic qualities of our 
interactions with the environment include proto-
evaluative elements, granting us a sort of primary 
orientation in the world both on the cognitive level and 
on the moral one.8 
 
However, I believe that the most typical Deweyan trait is 
the naturalistic – one might even say existentialistic – 
background to his position. Chapter Two of Experience 
and Nature emphasizes the precarious and uncertain 
quality of our experience of the world, forcing us to 
recognize that if man is fearful, his fear is first of all a 
                                                                       
would be fallacious to take its results to be primary 
elements.  
7 See Dewey, J. 1984. Qualitative Thought. In: The Later 
Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, Vol.5: 1929-1930, 
Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University 
Press, pp.243-262, and Dewey, J. 1988. Affective 
Thought. In: The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, 
Vol.2: 1925-1927, Carbondale and Edwardsville: 
Southern Illinois University Press, pp.104-110. 
8 I am referring to Dewey, J. 1978. Ethics. In: The Later 
Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, Vol.7: 1932, 
Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University 
Press and Dewey, J. Ethics 1985. In: The Middle Works of 
John Dewey, 1899-1924, Vol.5: 1908, Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press. On the 
other hand, in the essay quoted before James argues 
that it is the affective or aesthetic contour of our 
experiences that lends emphasis to certain objects at the 
expense of others, by showing that they are important, 
interesting or salient for us – and therefore allowing us 
to orientate ourselves in an environment where we 
would otherwise be exposed to an overwhelming range 
of stimuli. This last point however has more accurately 
been examined by Dewey, as I set out to argue in the 
next section of the text. 
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function of the environment and not a private feeling. 
Each form of life belongs to a certain environment, but 
human organisms, for their own physical, biological and 
even cultural characteristics, suffer from (or simply have) 
a peculiar degree and kind of exposure to their 
environment, because their behavioural answers are not 
predetermined, but plural as well as relatively free, and 
hence dangerous, risky. Therefore, it is man's peculiar 
human exposure to his environment and in particular his 
dependence from the social environment he belongs to 
from his premature birth onwards that ensures the 
central relevance of the so-called aesthetic aspects of 
our experience. First of all, our world is felt to be 
threatening or welcoming, fearful or delightful, painful or 
pleasurable, because every human interaction, from 
those of our ancestors to our present hyper-
technological ones, concerns our survival or our 
possibility of enhancing our lives, to make them flourish.  
 
If we follow Dewey's reasoning, these aspects cannot be 
removed from our idea of happiness and even freedom, 
but must be combined with his more ethical and political 
observations on these themes. Complementary human 
experiences cannot be reduced to cognitive inquiries or 
to reflexive analyses, even if they play a central role in 
our lives, while the most distinctive trait of our humanity 
cannot be exclusively confined to reason, because we do 
not spend our whole lives reflecting and solving 
problems: very often we simply enjoy or suffer the world 
around us, being guided within it by our sensibility, and 
reacting to its affections more or less habitually. Hence, 
these aspects must be carefully considered if we are to 
define the peculiar freedom and happiness of human 
beings as opposed to an alleged disembodied 
consciousness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The ethical and political relevance  
    of aesthetic aspects 
 
A first very simple observation – a rather trivial point, yet 
one rarely made by scholars – can help bring into focus 
the deep moral and political implications of the aesthetic 
aspects of our experience according to Dewey's thought: 
we need to remember that the most important texts 
centred on the aesthetic aspects of our experiences and 
on the role of art in our interactions with the world – 
that is Chapter 9. of Experience and Nature, dating back 
to 1925, and Art as Experience, published in 1934 – were 
written in the same period in which Dewey presented 
two of his most important political essays – The Public 
and its Problems, 1927, and Individualism Old and New, 
1929 – and prepared the second edition of his Ethics, 
which was developed together with James Tufts and 
published in 1932.9 
 
To any reader of these political writings it is clear that 
aesthetic questions are an integral part of political 
questions for Dewey, in the sense that they play a 
structural role in human interactions with a natural and 
naturally social environment and hence cannot be 
                                                 
9 Dewey, J. 1984. The Public and Its Problems. In: The 
Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, Vol.2: 1925-
1927, Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois 
University Press and Dewey, J. 1988. Individualism Old 
and New. In: The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, 
Vol.5: 1929-1930, Carbondale and Edwardsville: 
Southern Illinois University Press. The first person to 
grasp the political implications of Dewey's aesthetics was 
probably George Herbert Mead (see Mead, G.H. 1926. 
“The Nature of Aesthetic Experience”. In: International 
Journal of Ethics. 36/4, pp.382-393), although Georgina 
Melvin also noted this aspect in 1937 (now Melvin, G. 
The Social Philosophy Underlying Dewey's Theory of Art. 
In: Tiles, J.E. (ed.) 1992. John Dewey. Critical 
Assessments. Vol.III: Value, Conduct and Art, New York: 
Routledge, pp.302-311). For an historical as well as 
theoretical survey of the connections between Dewey's 
aesthetics and his thoughts on democracy see 
Westbrook, R. 1991. John Dewey and American 
Democracy. Ithaca-New York: Cornell University Press. 
With regard to his influence on the cultural policies of 
the New Deal, see Grieve, V. 2009. The Federal Art 
Project and the Creation of Middlebrow Culture. Urbana 
and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
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abstractly banished from the state – as the Platonic 
tradition recommends – and from human rational or 
allegedly purely critical evaluations, choices and actions, 
as suggested by a typically negative and uncompromising 
Adornoian position.10 On the contrary, those aesthetic 
aspects of our experience – such as the perceived 
significance of the environmental context with and 
within which our interactions take place, but also 
impulses, desires, emotional attitudes, pleasures and 
pains – have a structural function in pursuing a “public 
socialism” capable of making everyone's lives rich and 
expansive – and thus worthy of being lived – instead of 
merely embellishing people's barren existences in their 
work-free weekends.11 
 
Both The Public and its Problems and Individualism Old 
and New suggest a variety of negative examples: as 
human beings, we need to find gratification in what we 
are doing, in its social function – as with the satisfaction 
of being part of a whole afforded by nationalism in 
1930s, or even the exclusive and identity-centred 
communities of today. The need to identify ourselves 
with more than just intellectual principles, along with the 
need for an emotionally and imaginatively rich life, can 
be satisfied by those kinds of powerful totalitarian 
propaganda capable of eliciting fears and desires. Our 
need for consummatory experiences can find 
gratification in the cheap and extremely varied forms of 
amusement presently guaranteed by the industrial 
production of commodities and experiences and by their 
technological means of distribution. I would add that a 
confirmation of these observations strewn throughout 
Dewey's texts is now provided by the growing success of 
the so-called economy of experiences, which in contrast 
to classical economy considers the customer and his 
                                                 
10 The classical references are Plato. The Republic. Book 
X., but also Adorno, T.W.- Horkheimer, M. 1969, 
Dialektik dr Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente, 
Frankfurt am Main: Fischer and Adorno, T.W. 1970. 
Ästhetische Theorie, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
11 See Dewey, J. 1988. Individualism Old and New. cit. 
p.98. 
ways of behaving as bodily, sensuous and emotional 
needs to be satisfied, while maintaining the pursuit of 
exclusively private profit as an obvious and 
unquestionable assumption.12 
 
The point is that if we do not recognize that man is a 
“consuming animal” as well as a “political one”,13 we 
remain at the complete mercy of media providing very 
accessible forms of enjoyment and distracting us from 
political concerns, instead of enjoying the consequences 
of shared political actions. Because we do not simply 
need communication as a medium to convey 
informations, we tend to appreciate actualized 
communion – or even to hate it if it is felt to be 
oppressive rather than expansive and inclusive. 
 
On the ethical side, in the Ethics, in contrast to the 
modern foundation of aesthetics as the philosophy of 
art, Dewey reminds us of the common, deeply 
intertwined roots of aesthetic and ethical judgements.14 
Disgust and feelings of repulsiveness go hand in hand 
with judgements reflecting moral disapproval; feelings of 
admiration can constitute the basis for moral approval; 
and the sense of symmetry and proportion is not alien to 
that of fairness and justice. Of course, our primary sense 
of orientation in the world – what Dewey describes as 
customary morality – is above all based on reinforced 
                                                 
12 See Pine, B.J.-Gilmore, J.H. 1999. The Experience 
Economy. Work is Theatre and Every Business a Stage. 
Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 
Schmitt, B.H. 1999. Experiential Marketing: How to Get 
Customers to Sense, Feel, Think, At and Relate to Your 
Company and Brands, New York: The Free Press, 
Ferraresi, M.-Schmitt, B.H. 2006. Marketing esperenziale. 
Come sviluppare l'esperienza di consumo, Milano: Franco 
Angeli. 
13 Dewey, J. 1984. The Public and Its Problems. cit., 
p.321) 
14 On this point see Gadamer, H.G. 1960, Wahrheit und 
Methode. Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr, in particular the chapter 
devoted to the “Humanistische Leitbegriffe”. I have 
developed the thesis of the common roots of Dewey's 
aesthetic and ethic evaluations in Dreon R. 2012. Fuori 
dalla torre d'avorio. L'estetica inclusiva di John Dewey 
oggi. Genova: Marietti, Chapeter VI. “Qualcosa in 
comune tra l'estetico e l'etico. A partire da Dewey”. 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  6,  I ssu e 1 ,  2015 
TH E  AE S T H E T I C ,  P L E A S U R E  A N D  H A P P I N E S S ,  O R :  W H Y  F R E E D O M  I S  N O T  E N O U G H  
R o b e r t a  D r e o n  
 
 
 13 
habits and on the aesthetic significance that certain 
things, events and people have and exercise directly 
upon us, while our morality becomes reflexive by 
distinguishing between the various aspects of 
indeterminate situations, including regressive habits, 
inborn tendencies, impulses and immediate feelings. But 
we must also remember that, according to Dewey, every 
reflexive inquiry has to meet the needs of our primary 
unreflexive experience, has to enrich and expand its 
possibilities and can be evaluated by once again referring 
to implicit, often qualitative or aesthetic criteria.15 As 
previously noted, we must always remember that 
experience is not equivalent to – and not exhausted by – 
cognition (what Dewey defined as the intellectualistic 
fallacy), even if reason, as an active process of reflection, 
plays an indispensable function in resolving problems 
and enriching our ordinary experience with the results of 
previous inquiries.16 
 
3. Which idea of freedom? 
 
It is interesting to note that precisely in this period – 
from the late 1920s to the latter half of the 1930s, if we 
take Freedom and Culture into account – Dewey also 
developed a critical interpretation of our idea of 
freedom.17 In my opinion this analysis is related to his 
belief that the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and 
autonomy are not enough to develop a morally and 
politically good life, because a good life must also be a 
full, satisfactory, happy one – that is an inclusive, 
                                                 
15 Dewey, J. Ethics 1985. cit., p. 271.  
16 About the “intellectualistic fallacy” see Dewey, J. 1988. 
Experience and Nature. cit., pp.26-27, Dewey, J. 1988. 
The Quest for Certainty. In: The Later Works of John 
Dewey, 1925-1953, Vol.4: 1929, Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, pp.174-
175 and also Dewey, J. 1951, Experience, Knowledge and 
Value: a Rejoinder. In: Schlipp, P.A. (ed.), The Philosophy 
of John Dewey, La Salle: Northern University and 
Southern Illinois University Press, pp.297-309.  
17 Dewey, J. 1988. Freedom and Culture. In: The Later 
Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, Vol.13: 1938-1939, 
Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University 
Press, pp.63-188. 
expanding life, emotionally and imaginatively rich, 
capable of final consummations and not only of 
analytical reflections. Criticism in the sense of reflective 
thinking plays an important part in our everyday life that 
is in every situation where our habitual behaviours do 
not match environmental conditions as usual: whenever, 
that is, we have to act in a different way from what we 
are used to. We must not forget, however, that “much of 
life is immediate, appreciative, primary experience”.18 
 
The point, as argued in Freedom and Culture, is not to 
give up the idea of freedom – this would be a tragedy for 
Dewey, of course - but to ask whether our present desire 
for freedom is “inherent in human nature or is a product 
of special circumstances”.19 In this perspective, we 
should firstly recognize its connections with the social, 
political and economic conditions of the world where it 
appeared and secondly the possibility that our deeply 
changed material culture is ready for the emergence of a 
different concept of freedom. 
 
The first aspect to consider is the close relation between 
our idea of freedom and the modern tradition of 
individualism, already noted by Dewey in The Public and 
Its Problems.20 It must be recognized that a very strong 
claim against oppressive forms of power, starting from 
the Church in European countries, was converted into an 
inborn attribute, into the natural right of the individual, 
understood as an isolated and independent entity that is 
predetermined, regardless of any association with other 
individuals.  
 
Hence, both in the American and in the English liberal 
tradition, stretching back to Locke, the idea of freedom 
has been grounded on the individual as opposed to the 
                                                 
18 Cfr. Stroud, R. S., “John Dewey and the Question of 
Artful Criticism”. In: Philosophy and Rhetoric. 44/1/2011, 
p.38. 
19 Dewey, J. 1988. Freedom and Culture. cit., p.65. 
20 Dewey, J. 1984. The Public an Its Problems. cit., p.289 
and p.329. 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  6,  I ssu e 1 ,  2015 
TH E  AE S T H E T I C ,  P L E A S U R E  A N D  H A P P I N E S S ,  O R :  W H Y  F R E E D O M  I S  N O T  E N O U G H  
R o b e r t a  D r e o n  
 
 
 14 
social and has come to be defined in terms of autonomy 
or independence of choice. 
 
On the contrary, in The Public and Its Problems Dewey 
does not simply argue that humans are social, as most 
mammals are, because they structurally depend on their 
social environment in order to survive and flourish. The 
point is rather, on the one hand, to understand how 
human modes of association differ from other animal 
forms of association and, on the other, to consider how 
individuals are shaped by social habits, traditional 
behaviours, etc.21 From this point of view, freedom is 
very relevant, of course, as the source of individual 
identity and responsibility, yet it only comes into play 
later, within a consolidated system of responses and 
activities that is already there at the birth of the 
individual and which contributes to welcoming (or even 
rejecting) him – as Dewey's argument on the relations 
between customary and reflexive morality suggests. In 
this respect, individual freedom has to do with 
responsibility understood in an almost literary sense: as 
the need to respond to the impulses and the requests 
coming from our environment, and especially other 
people, by saying “I” after having habitually behaved like 
everyone else. 
 
Furthermore – and this second aspect is very important 
for the subject we are discussing in this paper – in 
Freedom and Culture Dewey reminds us of the fact that 
in the continental European tradition the idea of 
freedom is typically associated with that of pure 
rationality, as though every affective, qualitative or 
indeed aesthetic aspect were to be expunged from 
epistemological judgements and moral evaluations. It 
has already been recalled that, according to Dewey, “the 
idea that men are moved by an intelligent and calculated 
                                                 
21 Dewey developed this second point in his work on 
social psychology (Dewey, J. 1988. Human Nature and 
Conduct. In: The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-
1924, Vol.14: 1922, Carbondale and Edwardsville: 
Southern Illinois University Press). 
regard for their own good is pure mythology”22 – a myth 
that lives on in the modern idea of the homo 
oeconomicus. It is well known that the American 
pragmatist, like William James, constantly emphasized 
the regulative, controlling and selective role of the 
affective, qualitative aspects of our inquiries – that is, 
even in relation to our reflexive analysis of our 
immediate experience, both when an indeterminate 
situation is eminently a moral one or when it deals more 
properly with epistemological problems. 
 
I would argue that this criticism has to do with Dewey's 
rejection of the alleged body-mind dualism and the 
particular attention he devoted to its political 
consequences. As he writes in an essay from the same 
years, Body and Mind (1928), the idea of distinguishing 
an allegedly nobler part of our humanity – the spiritual 
one – from the more animal-like one – the material side 
– is not just a speculative question, but “is the most 
practical of all questions we can ask of our civilization”.23 
The problem is that “spiritual idealism” – like traditional 
modern individualism – is a “state of action” legitimating 
a situation where “ends are privately enjoyed in isolation 
from means of execution and consequent public 
betterment”.24 
 
Hence, which idea of freedom are we to uphold and 
develop, once we acknowledge the historical ties of the 
present conception of liberty to the ideology of 
individualism – both past and present – and the myth of 
an allegedly pure rational will?  
 
I would suggest that, even though Dewey is critical of the 
form of human association achieved by the present 
technological, industrial and financial means of 
production, exchange and consumption, he believes that 
                                                 
22 Dewey, J. 1984. The Public an Its Problems. cit., p.335.  
23 Dewey, J. 1984. Body and Mind. In: The Later Works 
(1925-1953), Vol. 3: 1927-1928, Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, p.8. 
24 Ibidem. 
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we need to consider whether they can create the 
conditions for new, intelligent and less regressive modes 
of being free individuals. Maybe they can help us bring 
out a new form of freedom which is no longer envisaged 
as standing in contrast to the social and as requiring us 
to strip every qualitative, affective or emotional aspect 
from our supposedly pure rational will. What I mean by 
this is an idea of freedom capable of including aspects of 
pleasure, the possibility of enjoying what we do, of 
enjoying our lives and deriving pleasure from our 
relations with other people and the situations we 
experience. In contrast with the typical assumptions of 
the Enlightenment, Dewey tells us that “Fraternity, 
liberty and equality isolated from communal life are 
hopeless abstractions”.25 However we can understand 
and practice freedom otherwise, as “personal 
participation in the development of a shared culture”,26 
as the 
 
“secure release and fulfillment of personal 
potentialities which take place only in rich and 
manifold association with others: the power of 
being an individualized self-making a distinctive 
contribution and enjoying in its own way the 
fruits of association.”27 
 
For the purposes of the present discussion, it might be 
useful to compare this conception of freedom to some 
considerations by Amartya Sen on the subject. Firstly, it 
is worth noting that Sen emphasizes the ambiguities of 
the concept of individual freedom in his Individual 
Freedom as Social Commitment.28 By recalling Isaiah 
Berlin's famous distinction between negative and 
positive conceptions of liberty,29 that is between the lack 
of limitations an individual can impose on another and 
what a person can achieve, Sen suggests that the limits 
                                                 
25 Dewey, J. 1984. The Public an Its Problems. cit., p.329. 
26 Dewey, J. 1988. Individualism Old and New. cit. p.57. 
27 Dewey, J. 1984. The Public an Its Problems. cit., p.329. 
28 Sen, A. 1998, “Individual Freedom as Social 
Commitment”. In: India International Centre Quaterly. 
1/1998-1999, p.53-69. 
29 Berlin, I. 1969. Four Essays on Liberty, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
between negative and positive forms of freedom are 
often nuanced and overlapping, because of their 
reciprocal implications and intertwining. Sen thus 
upholds the thesis that social commitment in favour of 
individual freedom has to consider both sides of freedom 
itself. In the Deweyan perspective, the negative 
definitions of freedom appear to be historically 
connected to individualism and the need for a positive 
form of freedom is invoked as the possibility to develop a 
new, more intelligent and less regressive form of 
individual and associated life. 
 
Secondly, it is worth recalling another distinction 
suggested by Sen some years before, in his 1984 Dewey 
Lectures Well-being, Agency and Freedom, and which 
can be more fruitfully be compared to Dewey's position. 
According to Sen, a more basic distinction with regard to 
freedom than that between its negative and positive 
meanings is the distinction between power and control. 
We can understand freedom by focusing on the effective 
power to achieve some results, to bring certain 
consequences about, but also by pointing out “weather 
the person is himself exercising control over the process 
of choice”.30 In our tradition of moral and political 
philosophy the tendency to overemphasize the 
autonomous control of the subject over his own acts has 
been privileged even at the expanse of evaluative 
considerations of the actual consequences of his actions. 
Sen criticizes this overestimation of the controlling 
aspects of freedom in favour of a wider 
conceptualization of freedom itself, capable of taking 
into account also the actual power of achieving results. 
This is an important point because, as may be seen in the 
following pages of Sen's lecture, it is strictly connected 
with the structural “interdependency of social living”.31 If 
we were to couch the question in Deweyan terms, we 
might say that the consequences of our actions for 
                                                 
30 Sen, A. 1985. “Well-being, Agency and Freedom: The 
Dewey Lectures 1984”. In: The Journal of Philosophy. 
82/4, p. 209. 
31 Ibidem, p. 211. 
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others, what we actually do to others, is at least as 
important as the fact that we can exercise complete 
control over our own actions. Furthermore, this is one 
aspect with regard to which Dewey is able to reconsider 
Mill's peculiar contribution in comparison with 
Bentham's, while Sen is more generally critical of 
utilitarian positions. But I will return to this point later 
on. What I wish to stress here is that both Sen and 
Dewey seem to share a view of human social 
dependence from others as a structural component of a 
definition of freedom not only in its negative aspects, as 
independence from foreign coercion, but also in its 
affirmative and productive sense, as the power to 
achieve something. 
 
However there is another aspect, apart from structural 
interdependency, that is lacking in Sen's account of 
freedom, while it plays a role in Dewey's thought. At a 
first glance, this might seem like a mere matter of 
emphasis, but Dewey always includes an element of 
enjoyment in the free contribution to a community, 
together with an enhancement of living that can be 
immediately felt or brought to its consummation. While 
we cannot ignore the wide number of situations in which 
freedom stands in contrast to well-being, the American 
pragmatist seems to suggest that a closer relation exists 
between the two. In other words, Dewey's argument 
suggests that a free choice and above all a free life must 
not only include a reflexive comprehension of what we 
are doing, but must be also felt and possibly enjoyed in 
itself. 
 
4. Happiness, well-being  
     and the perceived quality of life 
 
In recent decades a very interesting debate has taken 
place in the economic field about happiness and its 
relation to wealth. The problem emerged thanks to 
Easterlin's famous inquiries on the relation between 
happiness and riches, dating back to 1970. His 
researches revealed a paradox, namely that the degree 
of happiness felt by an individual does not increase 
proportionally to the rising of his financial resources. 
While at a low level an increase of income can be very 
important for the betterment of life conditions and 
correlatively of the degree of life satisfaction, further 
income risings are often only temporarily relevant, but 
very soon lose their significance.  
 
This discovery of a more complex relationship between 
happiness and wealth is philosophically significant 
because it challenges the traditional model of the homo 
oeconomicus, whose individual choices are supposed to 
be guided exclusively by the calculation of the total 
amount of utilities he can ensure for himself.32 Secondly, 
it has been noted33 that this interest of economics in 
happiness is not completely new, because it 
characterized a minority economic school – the losing 
one in comparison to the classical economics of Smith 
and Ricardo, originally oriented to pursuing the wealth of 
nations, and later just private profit – that is the Italian 
school of Genovesi, which was focused on the pursuit of 
“felicità pubblica”, or “public happiness”. Evidently, this 
is no minor difference, because it concerns nothing less 
than the end which economics is supposed to pursue. 
But the important point in relation to our present speech 
is that this discussion has led to a kind of polarization 
between two different concepts of happiness, 
represented by two key figures in the debate, Amartya 
Sen and Daniel Kahneman.  
 
In brief, the notion of happiness upheld by Kahneman is 
explicitly derived from Jeremy Bentham and consists in 
the pursuit of momentary pleasure, in the “hedonic 
quality”, conceived as “experienced utility”.34 
                                                 
32 See Motterlini, M.- Piattelli Palmarini M. (eds.), 2012., 
Critica della ragione economica. Milano: il Saggitore, 
p.12.  
33 See Bruni, L. 2002, Felicità e scienza economica. Storia, 
problemi aperti e spunti teorici. In: Working Paper Series- 
University Milan-Bicocca, 48/2002. 
34 Kanheman, D. 1997. “Back to Bentham? Explorations 
of Experienced Utility”. In: The Quaterly Journal of 
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Kanheman's contribution is centred on the idea of 
distinguishing a memory-based approach to experienced 
utility from a moment-based utility, because this 
distinction enables a more reliable calculation of 
happiness, understood as the sum of the total utility 
based on instant utility units, rather than as a final 
subjective judgement on the happiness of a certain 
period of time that has already passed. However, it is 
clear that this position betrays many unquestioned 
assumptions, the first one being that happiness is 
equivalent to pleasure or to a sum of pleasures; the 
second, that pleasure is a sort of sensation that it is 
instantaneous and can differ only in quantity. 
 
Criticizing the utilitarian concept of happiness and the 
role it is supposed to play in connection to the 
administration of our resources. Sen prefers to speak 
about well-being, “human flourishing” or “fulfilment”, by 
explicitly referring to the ancient Aristotelian idea of 
eudaimonia, where happiness is strictly related to the 
exercise of virtue.35 In particular, Sen points to the 
contrast between happiness as a hedonic quality and 
freedom, which can be deeply compromised by the 
pursuit of momentary pleasures. For example people, 
may feel satisfied by mass consumption or ideological 
propaganda, but of course these pleasurable experiences 
could imply a deprivation of freedom. 
 
To summarize Sen's position, we might say – with David 
Crocker – that “Human well-being cannot be identified 
with utility, and, for Sen, the human good cannot be 
identified with well-being”.36 The second part of this 
                                                                       
Economics, 112/2, 375-405 and Kanheman, D. 2000. 
Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-
Based Approach. In: Kanheman, D.. Tversky, A. (eds.) 
2000, Choices, Values and Frames, Cambridge: Camridge 
University Press, pp.673-692. 
35 See Sen, A. 2006. La felicità è importante ma altre cose 
lo sono di più. In: Bruni, l.- Porta, P.L. (eds.) 2006. Felicità 
e libertà. Economia e benessere in prospettiva 
relazionale. Milano: Guerini e Associati, pp.39-58. 
36 Crocker D.A. 1992. “Functioning and Capability: The 
Foundations of Sen's and Nussbaum's Development 
formula lead us back to Sen's thesis according to which a 
good moral approach – in open contrast with the 
reductive utilitarian approach - must take into account 
not only well-being, but also agency as a crucial factor, 
which cannot be neglected by focusing only on the 
benefits or the disadvantages we can get from our 
interactions.37 But it is the first part of this thesis that is 
more interesting for the present argument. What is well-
being and how can it be defined? According to Sen, it 
cannot be reduce to either a subjective momentary state 
or utility, or even to the fulfilment of desire, but rather 
has to do with human functionings and capacities. If 
living is “a combination of doings and beings”, the 
functioning vector characterizing each one of us results 
from “the various combinations of things a person is able 
to do or be – the various functionings he or she can 
achieve”.38 Sen suggests that well-being is connected to 
human capabilities that is to the freedom of choosing 
between different combinations of functionings, 
between what we might call different forms of life and 
different ideas of a good life. 
 
This emphasis on what we could do or be does not at all 
sound alien to a Deweyan ear, which is used to 
pragmatically focusing on the consequences of our 
actions. Nevertheless it must be noted that this 
conception tends to expunge or almost marginalize 
human pleasures (at least more material or sensuous 
ones) – people's needs and desires to derive enjoyment 
from what they are doing, from their relations with 
others and their environment, from the perceived quality 
of their life. Robert Sudgen maintains that the so-called 
capacity-based approach shared by Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum is conditioned by their traditionally 
humanistic attitude, so that, although they grant human 
                                                                       
Ethic”. In: Political Theory, 20/4, p.602. 
37 See Sen, A. 1985. “Well-being, Agency and Freedom: 
The Dewey Lectures 1984”. cit. 
38 Sen, A. Capability and Well-being. In: Haussman, M. 
(ed.) 2007. The Philosophy of Economics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp.270-271. 
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emotions, desires and even appetites a certain 
significance, they always subordinate them to the role of 
our rationality, which is considered as the most 
distinctive and most authentic trait of the human 
being.39 
 
I believe that some of Dewey's suggestions allow us to 
consider a third option, strictly related to the structurally 
aesthetic or qualitative aspects of our human 
interactions with the environment, capable of not being 
confined to an idea of happiness as totally consisting in 
momentary, sensational pleasure, but also of not 
neglecting or expunging our sensibility. This third 
possibility may be seen to emerge both from Dewey's 
discussion of utilitarianism in the first version of his 
Ethics and from his concept of consummatory 
experience. A new, different kind of individualism – of 
being individuals – must be sought according to Dewey, 
but also – I would argue – a different kind of happiness, 
which is capable of including pleasure, enjoyment and 
fulfilment, and which does not neglect the characteristic 
human need to feel welcomed and gratified by one's 
environment.  
 
It is interesting to note that when he started dealing with 
the concept of happiness and its role in moral life in his 
Ethics (and particularly in the first 1908 edition) Dewey 
devoted a good number of pages to discussing utilitarian 
positions on pleasure. I speak of “positions” in the plural 
here because in his analysis Dewey is careful to 
distinguish between Bentham's and John Stuart Mill's 
interpretation of pleasure. But let us follow Dewey's 
reasoning. 
 
One of the first points is of course based on the 
traditional critique of the utilitarian conception of 
happiness as consisting in a mere cumulative sum of 
                                                 
39 Sudgen, R. 2006. Capacitazioni, felicità e opportunità. 
In: In: Bruni, l.- Porta, P.L. (eds.) 2006. Felicità e libertà. 
Economia e benessere in prospettiva relazionale. cit., 
pp.95-132. 
pleasures, whose differences can be only quantitative – a 
critique which Sen directs against Kanheman's return to 
Bentham. If pleasures are isolated entities, how can we 
measure and compare them, sum them up and subtract 
the pains? This is an aspect which has created some 
difficulties in classical economics, leading to the 
exclusion of factors of this kind from theories about 
consumer evaluation and choice – while Kahneman's 
distinction between “moment-based utility” and 
“memory-based utility” was partially meant to provide a 
solution to this problem. 
 
But the core of Dewey's criticism concerns two other 
aspects, deeply interrelated with the one just 
mentioned. On the one hand, the American pragmatist 
points out that, in contrast to the hedonistic perspective, 
we must note that our desires are primarily directed 
towards objects that can satisfy them and not pleasures, 
so that pleasure cannot be regarded as the object of 
desire; rather, a certain object becomes pleasurable 
because it corresponds to or satisfies a certain desire. 
This point reflects the Darwinian naturalism of Dewey, 
who observes that:  
 
„Biological instincts and appetites exist not for 
the sake of furnishing pleasure, but as activities 
needed to maintain life – the life of the individual 
and the species. Their adequate fulfilment is 
attended with pleasure. Such is the undoubted 
biological fact. […] But desire is still for the 
object, for the food.”40 
 
This is the reason why, according to Dewey, there can be 
no previous determination of allegedly substantive 
pleasures which our desires are supposed to pursue; 
rather, from time to time there are pleasurable things, 
satisfying our desires. But this is the reason why we have 
to recognize that desires and the need for satisfaction 
are as structurally human as reflexive reason in both a 
moral and cognitive sense. Happiness has to conform to 
these aspects, even if it cannot be reduced to them. 
                                                 
40 Dewey, J. 1978. Ethics. cit., p. 247. 
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Hence, we can say that Dewey takes the utilitarian 
interest in pleasure seriously. 
 
On the other hand, the second problem with a utilitarian 
conception of happiness is that it does not distinguish 
between the different existing levels: the first is the level 
of happiness understood as the fulfilment of desire, as 
the reaching of the desired end. But even if we 
understand happiness as the satisfaction of one's 
deepest needs and as self-development, this is a form of 
happiness which can be deeply compromised by one's 
character: a racist may desire to close his country to 
immigrants seeking political asylum, because “what has 
been said applies to the criminal as well as to the saint; 
to the miser and the prodigal and the wisely generous 
alike”.41 Therefore, we need a “conception of happiness 
as a standard”,42 that is we need a criterion to distinguish 
the true or good form of happiness.  
 
This is the point where Dewey discriminates between 
Bentham and Mill, by generally appreciating the 
utilitarian social characterization of the good, with its 
resulting claims to democracy, equality and the 
structural criticism of established patterns of behaviour 
and thought. Their shared idea is that because “the true 
good is [...] an inclusive or expanding end”, “the only end 
which fulfils these conditions is the social good”.43 The 
problem with Bentham, however, is that in his view “the 
desired object is private and personal pleasure”.44 On the 
contrary, Dewey seems to find already in Mill's thought 
one of his most distinguishing thesis, that is the idea that 
we are structurally social beings: “We cannot think of 
ourselves save as to some extent social beings”.45 This 
means that the happiness of the other people whom we 
are always more or less associated with is a basic part of 
our own happiness: we cannot but find our own good in 
                                                 
41 Ibidem, p. 255.  
42 Ibidem, p. 251. 
43 Ibidem, p. 261. 
44 Ibidem, p. 263. 
45 Ibidem, p. 268. 
the good of others.46 Sympathy or benevolence are not 
further traits of an individual, which can help him reach 
his or her ends; rather – together with negative social 
affections – they are a basic part of naturally social 
beings, whose well-being depends on and is constituted 
together with the well-being of others. In this way the 
common good proves to be a standard for distinguishing 
what sort of happiness we are pursuing. 
 
Nonetheless, it may be argued that this aspect could be 
understood as almost partially convergent with the idea 
of happiness as eudaimonia, where virtue is of course 
not conceived as the property of an isolated and 
independent individual that can further establish 
relations with his or her counterparts, but is rather based 
on humans sharing a common world.  
 
I would not say that Dewey is utterly foreign to the 
Aristotelian conception of happiness: he explicitly speaks 
in favour of Aristotele's eudaimonia in the second edition 
of his Ethics. What I am suggesting is that Dewey has 
something more to say about happiness and social ties, 
since he characterizes the common good as “the 
adequate aesthetic and intellectual development of the 
conditions of a common life”.47 “Aesthetic” here does 
not primarily refer to artistic activities, but rather to the 
possibility of enjoying perceived qualities of life and in 
particular what Dewey calls “communion actualized”. 
Desires and pleasures are an integral part of our 
unreflexive experience and it is necessary to 
acknowledge that they play an important role even in 
the constitution of our happiness, in so far as this implies 
that our experiences must be brought their fulfilment, or 
consummation, and not merely be critically or reflexively 
evaluated. Hence, moving towards a conclusion, I would 
like to spend some words on Dewey's concept of 
consummatory experience. 
 
                                                 
46 Ibidem, p. 269. 
47 Ibidem, p.272. 
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5. Consummatory experiences and life prosperity 
 
The term consummation is introduced in the chapter of 
Experience and Nature entitled “Nature, Ends and 
Histories”, in order to present the thesis that in our 
immediate unreflexive experience objects are felt to be 
final: that they “have the same quality of immediate and 
absorbing finality that is possessed by things and acts 
dignified by the title of esthetic. For man is more 
preoccupied with enhancing life than in bare living”.48 
 
This quote is especially interesting in two regards. 
 
First of all, it suggests that human beings primarily tend 
to be absorbed by the world they live in – feeling 
assaulted, embraced or rejected; that they tend to enjoy 
or suffer the situations, things and individuals in the 
environment they are interacting with from within. In 
other words, human beings are inclined to complete 
their interactions until their fulfilment, their 
consummation. 
 
The second interesting point is that Dewey makes this 
claim within the context of his naturalistic stance – a 
cultural-naturalistic, not reductionistic one. Against this 
background, it is clear that no organism is self-sufficient, 
as it develops and dies only in connection with the 
environment on which its life energies depend. But the 
peculiarity of human beings is that the energetic 
exchange is never oriented towards mere subsistence; 
rather, it also ensures the enhancement of life itself, of 
its prosperity and development. Dewey considers the 
anthropological results of the inquiries of Boas or 
Goldenweiser as reinforcing his thesis. 
 
Furthermore, we have to remember that various Dewey 
scholars have pointed out that in Art as Experience the 
concept of consummation – when used to describe one 
experience that might range from the aesthetic aspects 
                                                 
48 Dewey, J. 1988. Experience and Nature. cit., p.71. 
in our ordinary experiences to eminently artistic forms of 
interaction – does not regard our immediate, unreflexive 
experiences, but rather a third phase of experiencing, 
where the results of a previous analytic, reflexive phase 
are absorbed and enjoyed in themselves.49 
 
As already George Mead had understood after the 
publication of Experience and Nature, the idea of 
consummatory experience concerns the possibility of 
enjoying what we are doing without having to rush 
beyond it, in order to achieve a further purpose.50 An 
experience can be described as consummatory when it 
succeeds in being complete, in coming to its fulfilment, 
in the sense that we do not limit ourselves to 
instrumentally pursuing a certain end, but enjoy even 
the means by which we reach it, and this fact produces a 
reinforcement or an enhancement of living. From this 
point of view, the idea of consummatory experience is 
very far from any form of teleological behaviour: for it 
requires us to pay attention to and take care of what we 
are doing so as to enjoy it in itself, without being wholly 
focused on the pursuit of a given end. 
 
This point of view helps us appreciate what is peculiar in 
Dewey's conception of happiness, even when it is more 
or less understood in terms of communion, of the 
sharing of a common world, of the finding of individual 
identity in the contribution each person can provide: it 
                                                 
49 See Mathur, D.C. 1998. A Note on the Concept of 
“Consummatory Experience” in Dewey's Aesthetics. In: 
Tiles, J.E. (ed.) John Dewey: Critical Assessments, Volume 
III: Value, Conduct and Art. cit., pp.367-373. See also 
Zeltner, P.M. 1975. John Dewey's Aesthetic Philosophy, 
Amsterdam: Gruner B.V., who takes into account 
Dewey's answer to Romanell's criticism (Romanell, P. 
1949. “A Comment on Croce's and Dewey's Aesthetics”. 
In: Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 8/1949, 
pp.395-398; for Dewey's answer see Dewey, J. 1950. 
“Aesthetic Experience as a Primary Phase and as an 
Artistic Development”. I:n Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, 9/1950, pp.56-58. See too Kaminsky, J. 1957. 
“Dewey's Concept of an Experience”. In: Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 17/3, 1957, pp.316-330. 
50 See Mead, G.H. 1926. “The Nature of Aesthetic 
Experience”. cit. 
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refers not to any kind of Kantian normative ideal – or 
regulatory idea – but to the effective, consummatory 
enjoyment of this kind of state.  
 
To conclude with a formula, from a Deweyan point of 
view a better life consists not just in a more rational, 
wiser or more virtuous life, but also in a more satisfying 
one, capable of enhancing our experiences at all levels. 
To quote Friedrich Schiller's Letters, which opened this 
essay: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Um aller Mißdeutungen vorzugeben, bemerke 
ich, daß, so oft hier von Freyheit die Rede ist, 
nicht diejenige gemeynt ist, die dem Menschen, 
als Intelligenz betrachtet, notwendig zukommt, 
und ihm weder gegeben noch genommen 
werden kann, sondern diejenige, welche sich auf 
seine gemischte Natur gründet.51 
  
                                                 
51 Schiller, J.C.F. 1879. Über die ästhetische Erziehung des 
Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen. cit. The quotation is 
from the note to Letter XIX. 
